Abstract
Introduction: Trade, Bioenergy and Regimes
Creating an international governance system has become increasingly complicated. It is more and more difficult for universal systems to emerge around any particular issue because the relevant actors and their interests are diversified and the issues being addressed have multiple dimensions. Accordingly, we observe the phenomena of fragmented governance with multiple coexisting regimes. The regulation of production, trade and the use of bioenergy is one such example. The term 'bioenergy' refers to 'energy derived from the conversion of biomass where biomass may be used directly
In the context described above, this article addresses the fragmented governance system for sustainable bioenergy. It analyses why the governance of bioenergy is fragmented at different levels (international, regional and private) and how the multiple coexisting regimes relate to each other. The arguments presented in this article are drawn mainly from the recent theory of 'regime complexes', focusing on the food system efficiency so as to deliver and ensure specific product and process attributes at reasonable cost to consumers. Nevertheless, these standards may also be exclusionary for certain producers. ' relationships between multiple coexisting regimes. In political science and international relations, 'regimes' are defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures ' . 10 This definition includes both binding and non-binding agreements and is thereby suitable for the case of sustainable bioenergy. Although the concept of regimes was developed in the 1980s, the consequences of regime complexes attracted scholars' attention only about a decade ago. The research interests in regime complexes also resonate with the recent discussion over 'regime interaction in international law' among international lawyers.
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The rest of this article proceeds as follows. The second section reviews developments in the literature on regime complexes. The focus of regime complex research has gradually changed; the most recent literature emphasizes productive interactions between coexisting regimes and suggests positive consequences from the regime complexes. The third and fourth sections take up the specific case of sustainable bioenergy and biofuels. The third section describes the evolution of multiple sustainability regimes in bioenergy, particularly focusing on the three most relevant ones: an international governmental regime, a regional regime (the EU's initiative) and private certification regimes. The fourth section analyses the operation of the regime complex in the sustainable bioenergy domain. The fifth discusses ways in which the operation of the current regime complex can be improved, applying the theoretical framework presented in the second section. The final section presents the conclusion.
Recent Developments in the Literature on Regime Complexes
Climate change is a well-studied case of regime complexes involving numerous regimes and a wide variation in regime types. 12 Although the case of climate change experienced initial regulatory attempts through an integrated regime at the international level -the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol -no such core umbrella regime exists for sustainable bioenergy. 13 Rather, the bioenergy domain has been fragmented from the beginning and remains that way. There is a large difference between climate change and sustainable 10 bioenergy. Analysing the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy, this article will provide an important contribution to the empirical work on point. Kal Raustiala and David Victor's 2004 work is one of the pioneer studies on regime complexes. Raustiala and Victor define the concept of a regime complex as 'an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issuearea '. 14 Their work investigates the domain of plant genetic resources, which has five elemental regimes that 'overlap in scope, subject, and time; events in one affect those in others'. 15 They point out that ' [t] he rules in these elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is no agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules'. 16 Thus, the purpose of their research was to examine the interactions between these regimes and ascertain whether the interactions create supportive/complementary or conflicting rules.
While Raustiala and Victor's work assumes some inconsistencies between regimes '[w]ith conflicting interests as well as divergent rules', the regimes might be simply interconnected without conflicts. 17 Recently, the concept of a regime complex has been defined more loosely. Robert Keohane and Victor's 2011 work explains that '[r]egime complexes are marked by connections between the specific and relatively narrow regimes but the absence of an overall architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set'. 18 In other words, under a regime complex situation, regimes 'need not be overlapping, so long as they are loosely connected ' . 19 This article follows this definition of a regime complex.
Furthermore, the recent concept of a regime complex highlights the role of the various actors involved in multiple coexisting regimes. While Raustiala and Victor did not necessarily limit regimes to inter-state institutions, they did not explore the role of NGOs or private business institutions. 20 In a more recent study, Kenneth Abbott uses the term 'transnational regime complex' and defines it as 'the roles played by actors from three major categories -states, firm, and civil society organization'. 21 Abbott's explicit inclusion of non-state actors broadened the scope of the research and allowed 14 for a more dynamic perspective regarding regime complexes. The role of non-state actors is especially relevant to the current regime situation for sustainable bioenergy, wherein private certification schemes have been emerging in business and trade. Another development in the recent literature on regime complexes involves a search for positive effects of a regime complex, in contrast to earlier works that were particularly concerned with causes and negative effects of regime complexes. Recent research seeks to identify and understand the positive consequences from regime complexes: whether 'regime complexes have some distinctive advantages over integrated, comprehensive regimes' 22 or whether 'decentralization offers important advantages that would be sacrificed by tight integration'. 23 For instance, it has been argued that the regime complex for climate change has produced the benefits of 'flexibility across issues' and 'adaptability over time '. 24 In this vein, Keohane and Victor offer six evaluative criteria to assess regime complexes normatively and identify how to improve their current functioning: (1) 'coherence' among regimes in the sense of being compatible and mutually reinforcing; (2) 'accountability' to relevant audiences; (3) 'determinacy' of rules in order to enhance compliance and reduce uncertainty; (4) 'sustainability' in the sense of being durable; (5) 'epistemic quality' in rules and (6) 'fairness' in the sense that '[institutions] should provide benefits widely, and not discriminate against states'.
25
Based on the aforementioned theoretical foundation, the next section begins by identifying three elemental regimes 26 that have engaged in setting sustainability criteria, standards or indicators for bioenergy/biofuels at different levels: an international regime, a regional regime (the EU) and various private certification regimes. The reality of the regime situation is more complicated if regimes engaged in other functions (such as research and knowledge exchange) are included. However, this article confines its scope to regimes engaged in standard-setting activities.
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In this regard, numerous states have established biofuel policies and laws. Existing studies have compared the sustainable biofuel policies of the three major producers (the EU, the USA 28 and Brazil
29
). There are other states that have established legal frameworks to deal with sustainable biofuels (for example, Japan, which does not 22 Keohane and Victor, supra note 18, at 19. 23 Abbott, 'Strengthening', supra note 19, at 72. 24 Keohane and Victor, supra note 18, at 15. 25 Ibid., at 16-17. 26 The term 'elemental regimes' is drawn from the article by Raustiala and Victor, supra note 14, at 279. 27 Even with a focus of standard-setting activities, the reality of the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy is more complicated than what is presented by this article. For other initiatives that are not addressed in this article, see the figure of IEA Bioenergy, produce biofuels but does import them). However, this article does not examine individual state's policies and laws regarding sustainable biofuels/bioenergy. Currently, national policies/laws are diversified, and even among the three major producers (the EU, the USA and Brazil) it has been indicated that 'large gaps remain in existing institutional and technological agro-environmental knowledge'. 30 This is one consequence of the lack of a central international regime in this domain.
Instead of looking at national policies and practices, this article focuses on the EU's sustainability criteria because 'the EU's policy is laudable given that no other states or regional bloc has introduced similar sustainability standards'. 31 In addition, it has been suggested that other states should 'learn experiences' from the EU. 32 Indeed, as discussed below, the EU is playing a focal role in the regime complex. Hence, while this article acknowledges that the reality of the regime situation is more complicated if different national regimes are included, it views that the performance and operation of the current regime complex, comprising three elemental regimes, will have implications for the future development of individual national policies on sustainable bioenergy.
Evolution of Sustainability Standard Setting and Three Elemental Regimes

A Regional Regime: The Sustainability Criteria under the EU Renewable Energy Directive
The EU was the first governing body to introduce a biofuels policy, and its current regulatory framework is the most stringent and well known in the world. Although previous studies have addressed the EU's sustainable biofuel regime, it is helpful to summarize its key features here. In 2003, the EU adopted its first two directives on biofuels. 33 At that time, the main purpose of these directives was to promote the use of biofuels by setting non-binding targets and reducing taxes on biofuels. However, it was argued that 'further legal measures were needed' in the form of binding targets and sustainability criteria. 34 Individual EU member states began to respond to this need: the United Kingdom's (UK) renewable transport fuels obligation (RTFO) order, the Netherlands' 'Cramer criteria' and Germany's biofuels sustainability ordinance were well-known initiatives before the adoption of the EU-level regulation. 36 Among them, it has been acknowledged that the UK's RTFO played an important role in the development of European biofuel policies. For the purpose of this article, it should be noted that the RTFO introduced the use of the private certification scheme of verification in companies' sustainability reporting. 37 Significantly, this approach influenced the EU-level regulation, as will be highlighted below.
At the EU level, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) was adopted in 2009, 38 and then amended in 2015. 39 The RED addresses biofuels for transportation and bioliquids for other purposes but not solid biomass (sourced from wood pellets and chips). This subsection focuses on the regulatory regime of transportation biofuels under the RED, whereas the discussions and framework on sustainable solid biomass are not addressed. 40 The RED establishes national targets for each EU member state. Furthermore, it requires that each member state ensure a 10 per cent share for renewable energy in the transport sector in order to promote the use of biofuels by 2020. 41 Simultaneously, the RED establishes three mandatory sustainability criteria.
The first criterion is concerned with GHG emission savings from the use of bio fuels. It requires that GHG emissions be reduced by at least 60 per cent for installations producing biofuels that start operation after 5 October 2015 (as for installations that were in operation on or before 5 October 2015, GHG emissions should be cut by at least 35 per cent, which increases to 50 per cent from 1 January 2018). 42 The second criterion focuses on GHG emissions related to changes in land use. 43 It stipulates that biofuels should not be made from raw materials obtained from land with high carbon stock, such as wetlands, forested areas or peatlands. The third criterion is concerned with the protection of biodiversity, providing that biofuels should not be made from raw materials obtained from land with high biodiversity, such as primary forests, wooded lands or highly biodiverse grasslands. 44 These sustainability criteria apply to both EU-produced biofuels and imported biofuels. Biofuels that do not comply with the sustainability criteria can also be placed 36 42 Ibid., Art. 17(2). 43 Ibid., Arts 17(4), (5). 44 Ibid., Art. 17(3). on the EU market. However, only biofuel energy that meets the RED criteria can be counted towards meeting the mandatory national targets or can receive financial support available to promote the use of biofuels. 45 Beyond these mandatory criteria for economic operators, the RED establishes several reporting obligations for the European Commission. 46 The reporting must cover how the EU's biofuel policy affects labour rights, food prices and respect for land-use rights in EU member states as well as in the non-EU countries where raw materials for biofuels are produced.
Finally, the RED also addresses an issue known as indirect land-use change (ILUC). ILUC occurs when the increase in demand for raw materials for biofuels causes agricultural land to be converted from food purposes to biofuel-related activity, leading to the conversion of non-agricultural land (for example, forests) for food purposes. Consequently, '[t] hrough this route, the extra biofuel demand can lead indirectly to land-use change, from which the term indirect land-use change is derived'.
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To lower ILUC risks was a major focus of amending the RED. 48 One controversial issue involves setting a maximum limit (within the overall 10 per cent target of the RED) for biofuels produced from food crops such as cereals, sugars and oilseeds. The capping is intended to reduce the demand for agricultural land and promote the biofuel production from nonfood sources (the so-called 'second generation and advanced biofuels'). However, such a capping will affect the production and business transaction of biofuels from food crops. Consequently, there have been intense debates among EU member states regarding the level of limitation. The amended RED introduced a new rule of a 7 per cent limit.
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Even though the substantive criteria provided in the RED are important, this article focuses more on the verification system of economic operators' compliance with the sustainability criteria. Among three verification options established by the RED, 50 the use of private certification schemes is the most important. 51 The European 45 Ibid., Art. 17(1). Thus, producers and exporters of biofuels outside the EU are compelled to comply with the RED's sustainability criteria in order to increase their chances of accessing the EU market. 49 Consolidated version of the RED, supra note 39, Art. 3(4)(d). 50 The first option is that it is each member state's obligation to ensure that operators provide information and data relevant to the sustainability criteria using an independent auditing system that can prove their compliance (Ibid., Art. 18(3)). The downside of this option is that it permits 28 different verification systems if each member state establishes its own independent system, which would increase the administrative burden for exporters to the EU biofuels market. The second verification option is that compliance can be demonstrated if the EU and its trade partners conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements that contain the RED's sustainability criteria (Ibid., Art. 18(4), subpara. 1). 51 Ibid., Art. 18(4), subpara. 2.
Commission recognizes and approves private certification schemes (note the precise wording in the RED is 'voluntary schemes') that can demonstrate compliance. It formally approves schemes by adopting a decision, and the approval is valid for a maximum of five years. 52 While there was a detailed document -the Communication from the Commission on Voluntary Schemes and Default Values -for the assessment and approval process of private schemes, 53 the amended RED introduced new reporting obligations for these approved schemes and the European Commission in terms of the operation of the schemes, such as transparency or stakeholder involvement. 54 Next, this article will discuss the role and implications of such private certification schemes in the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy/biofuels.
B Private Certification Schemes for Sustainable Bioenergy/Biofuels
At the time of writing, 19 private certification schemes had received approval from the European Commission. 55 The schemes approved by the Commission differ in their governance types/structures, standards and/or certification processes. Conducting a comprehensive comparison of all schemes is beyond the scope of this subsection. Instead, this discussion will highlight four key private schemes: the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials, formerly the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), the International Sustainability and Carbon Certification system (ISCC), Bonsucro and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). However, numerous bioenergy certification schemes are operating in addition to those approved by the Commission.
Although private schemes differ in various aspects, it is useful to differentiate them along two lines: types of initiatives and product coverage. First, private schemes generally fall into one of two types: multi-stakeholder initiatives and business/industry-based initiatives. The four schemes examined herein are all multi-stakeholder initiatives in the sense that representatives of relevant stakeholders -farmers/feedstock growers, biofuel producers, refining/marketing companies and NGOs/civil societies -are consulted during the standard-setting process and can participate in the decision-making process. While the ISCC system is seen as an instance of multi-stakeholder governance, it has been financially supported by the German government and so is sometimes referred to as a government-financed initiative.
these schemes fall into the latter category. Similarly, some schemes address not only the sustainable production of transportation biofuels but also sustainable biomass production, including food, bio-plastics, bio-chemicals and/or all forms of bioenergy (for example, electricity generated from solid biomass). The RSB and the ISCC system also have broad scopes.
In addition, the certification schemes can be compared according to their governance structure, substantive criteria and certifying process. Each scheme has organizational documents that establish its structure/membership and decision-making procedures. The core substantive standards on sustainability are usually called 'principles' and 'criteria' and tend to bundle several aspects of sustainability together (for example, GHG emission reductions; environmental protection, including the conservation of biodiversity, air, soil and water quality; compliance with labour rights, sometimes including the provision of safe and healthy working conditions; the observance of land-use rights; and the assessment of food prices). They also go even further than the RED by requiring compliance with relevant national laws and regulations, contributions to rural development and/or the assurance of participatory consultation processes among relevant actors. 57 In addition to such principles and criteria, the schemes have detailed procedures, indicators and guidance. These principles and criteria are concerned with what private schemes measure, whereas the indicators address how the criteria are measured. 58 Furthermore, there are some differences among the schemes as to how they certify and monitor compliance. Recent studies have compared the schemes in terms of the fees and costs required for applicants (that is, farms and mills) seeking to obtain a certification.
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With the increasing number of private certification schemes in the sustainable bioenergy domain, legitimacy has become an important element, because private schemes are not generally considered to be legitimate regulatory authorities. 60 Many private schemes now engage in the legitimation process, 61 as will be seen later in this article. There seems to be two reasons for private schemes to make such legitimation 57 efforts. First, it is a strategic behaviour of private actors to gain support and acceptance from users and other relevant audiences so that their certifications become more popular. Second, it is to meet the growing demands for legitimacy over private standards. Since 'private rules in the form of standards have far reaching consequences affecting a wide range of actors', 62 some consider that private standards should be as legitimate as public rules. In sum, '[private actors] seek to manage their legitimacy, both out of self-interest and because they perceive it to be the "right thing to do".' 63 There are two aspects of legitimacy: one is 'input legitimacy' or 'procedural legitimacy' and another is 'output legitimacy' or 'substantive legitimacy'. It is explained that the former 'derives from the process by which decisions are made, including factors such as transparency, participation, and representation', whereas the latter concerns 'the results of governance', such as whether 'a regime solve[s] problems effectively'. 64 Thus, in the context of input legitimacy of private certification schemes, the inclusion of relevant stakeholders matters, including whether the scheme's governance assures opportunities for participation, transparency in the decision-making process and equal representation among stakeholders. 65 While the four schemes (RSB, ISCC, Bonsucro and RSPO) are all seen as multi-stakeholder initiatives, their governance systems comprise different stakeholder groups and decision-making procedures. Thus, there may be the risk of lacking input legitimacy -for instance, if a governing organ of a scheme does not comprise an equal number of relevant stakeholders.
On the other hand, output legitimacy of private certification schemes is concerned with political decisions and solutions regarding sustainability sought by private regimes, such as the evaluation and measurement of the impact of sustainability standards and certification. However, it is difficult to assess whether private schemes are effectively responding to sustainability concerns and generating positive impacts on bioenergy production. Although it may be possible to assess short-term impacts on certified members (farms/mills), it is difficult to evaluate long-term economic, social and environmental effects on local people and communities.
Nevertheless, one possible way to test standard impacts is through the code developed by the ISEAL Alliance. The ISEAL Alliance is 'the global membership association for sustainability standards', and its mission is 'to strengthen sustainability standards systems'. 66 Being a member of the ISEAL implies that a scheme complies with the ISEAL codes. With regard to the effectiveness of the standards, the ISEAL Alliance has established an 'Impacts Code', which 'requires standards systems to develop and implement a monitoring and evaluation plan that includes all the steps required to 62 assess their contributions to social and environmental impact'. 67 Currently, the RSB, Bonsucro and the RSPO are qualified as full ISEAL members (that is, they follow the ISEAL Impacts Code).
Legitimacy is important for certification schemes. However, they must also respond to business realities by considering the practicality and flexibility of system operations. In one sense, this feature can be measured by the number of sustainability certifications issued. Among the four schemes being discussed, the most popular scheme is the ISCC, which has issued more than 8,300 certificates. 68 In contrast, Bonsucro has issued 51 certificates, 69 and the RSB has issued only 18. 70 Although the RSPO obtained the European Commission's approval in 2012, the RSPO's certification process was used by palm oil producers in Asia even before the Commission's approval, and, thus, the number of certified farm/oil mills is more than 350. 71 However, in terms of biofuel certification, the ISCC system has recently been gaining acceptance in Asia as well. Some biofuel firms doing business in Asia have begun to pursue both RSPO and ISCC certifications.
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Besides producers and firms, the work of private certification schemes has also reached national governments in Asia. For instance, Indonesia started a governmental certification scheme, entitled the Indonesian sustainable palm oil scheme (ISPO), in 2011, and originally, this scheme was conducted independently from existing private schemes. However, in 2013, the Indonesian government entered into an agreement with the RSPO to promote the sustainable production of palm oil. 73 Such a collaboration is understood as one step for 'national standard ISPO to become a globally recognized sustainability standard and to facilitate alignment with other certification schemes such as the international voluntary standard RSPO'. 74 offers one mechanism of how the proliferation of private certification schemes can help national regimes.
C International Regimes: Global Bioenergy Partnership
Regarding international regimes for sustainable bioenergy, the work of the Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) merits attention. At the time of writing, a committee under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was also drafting sustainability criteria for bioenergy, but this article does not address its work due to the limited information available about its drafting process (the ISO standard for 'Sustainability Criteria for Bioenergy' was finally published on 15 September 2015).
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The GBEP was launched in July 2005 under the Gleneagles Plan of Action by the G8 plus five countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) to 'support wider, cost effective, biomass and biofuels deployment, particularly in developing countries'. 76 It was formally established in May 2006. The GBEP is a voluntary forum that currently comprises 37 partners (23 countries and 14 international organizations and institutions), with another 39 countries and international organizations as observers. 77 The GBEP's secretariat is located at the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) headquarters in Rome, Italy.
In June 2008, the GBEP Task Force on Sustainability was established, and setting sustainability indicators for all forms of bioenergy (thus, not necessarily transportation biofuels) became an important GBEP mission. 78 The GBEP issued the first edition of its bioenergy sustainability indicators (GBEP indicators) in December 2011 as a report with a set of methodology sheets amounting to 211 pages. 79 The structure of the GBEP has three pillars (environmental, social and economic), and each pillar comprises eight indicators, for a total of 24 indicators. Initially, the draft contained more than 24 indicators, but intense debates resulted in the removal or consolidation of some indictors.
One key aspect of the GBEP indicators is their stated purpose. According to the GBEP report '[GBEP sustainability indicators] do not feature directions, thresholds or limits and do not constitute a standard, nor are they legally binding on GBEP Partners'. 80 Thus, in contrast to the EU RED or the standards of private certification schemes, the 75 With regard to its content, the environmental pillar covers common sustainability indicators, such as GHG emissions, soil, air and water quality, biodiversity and landuse change. ILUC was debated during the development of the indicators, but in the end, as the report stated, 'it has not yet been possible to include an indicator on ILUC' and 'further work is required to improve our understanding of and ability to measure indirect effects of bioenergy'.
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The social pillar includes common concerns about land-use rights, food security and labour rights, but it also provides some interesting issues. For instance, Indicator 10 is articulated as 'price and supply of a national food basket', although this topic was addressed under the title of 'food security' during the negotiating stage. 84 It appears that there were intense debates about the concept of food security. 85 The term 'labour rights' does not explicitly appear in the list of GBEP indicators under the social pillar. However, the concept is included in Indicator 12 regarding 'jobs in the bioenergy sector'. This indicator considers two aspects: (i) whether jobs are created as a result of bioenergy production and (ii) whether jobs are consistent with International Labour Organization principles. The introduction of these two aspects is interesting in that this 'job' indicator suggests both positive (that is, job creation) and negative (that is, the violation of labour rights) impacts from bioenergy production.
Furthermore, the social pillar involves two unique indicators: (i) 'change in unpaid time spent by women and children collecting biomass' (Indicator 13) and (ii) 'change in mortality and burden of disease attributable to indoor smoke' (Indicator 15). These two indicators are particularly concerned with developing countries. It has been pointed out that '[t]he most important energy service today in many developing countries is cooking', and 'the large amount of firewood, collected over great distances, [is] necessary for fuelling the small and inefficient stoves'. 86 Thus, these indicators 81 This methodology is based on the GBEP Common Methodological Framework for Greenhouse Gas Lifecycle Analysis of Bioenergy, version 1, developed by the GBEP Task Force on Greenhouse Gas Methodologies. 82 GBEP Report, supra note 79, at 18. 83 Ibid., at 32, n. 11. 84 consider the issues specific to cooking technologies and local communities in the production and use of bioenergy for developing countries. This list of indicators appears rich in the environmental, social and economic dimensions. However, it is questionable whether such an extensive list can generate a meaningful, practical impact on domestic bioenergy policies. Currently, the GBEP indicators are in their implementation phase, and this process is developed within the context of the Working Group on Capacity Building for Sustainable Bioenergy, which was established in 2011. 87 This implementation phase will provide opportunities to test the suitability and feasibility of the indicators. Pilot projects have already been conducted in Colombia, Indonesia, Germany, Ghana, Japan and the Netherlands.
It is reasonable to think that the volume and complexity of the 24 indicators will require efforts by governments in gathering and evaluating data according to each indicator. Moreover, the GBEP indicators, because of their voluntary characteristics, may not result in direct and immediate changes in domestic policies if policy makers decide not to follow the suggestions and heed the results obtained from the indicators. However, the indicators may have a subtle and nuanced influence that would still mark an important step in the sustainable production of bioenergy. According to the GBEP's executive secretary, Maria Michela Morese, the GBEP indicators have contributed to raising awareness of African countries' views on both the opportunities and challenges of bioenergy. African countries previously perceived the focus on bioenergy as an unsuitable policy because it would affect food security. However, Morese now observes that some African countries -in particular, those in the Economic Community of West African States, 88 which have strongly collaborated with the GBEP -have become aware of the fact that bioenergy can also create opportunities for increasing employment and rural development. Thus, the indicators are helping to provide countries with knowledge and guidance. 89 The GBEP indicators could stimulate crucial learning among domestic stakeholders in the bioenergy sector of developing countries and could facilitate their internal communications.
Explaining the Regime Complex for Sustainable Bioenergy A How the Regime Complex Operates
This section begins by examining how the regime complex, comprising the three elemental regimes, functions overall. How 'loosely' do the three regimes connect to each 87 Within the working group, Activity Group 2 is working towards 'raising awareness, and sharing of data and experience on the implementation of the GBEP indicators'. See Activity Group 2, available at www. globalbioenergy.org/programmeofwork/working-group-on-capacity-building-for-sustainable-bioenergy/activity-group-2/pt/ (last visited 24 February 2016). 88 For cooperation between the GBEP and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), see the GBEP website for a concept note on an ECOWAS-GBEP Workshop on the Piloting of GBEP Sustainability Indicators, held in Praia, Cape Verde, on 7-8 November 2013, available at www.globalbioenergy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/gbep/docs/2013_events/GBEP_workshop_Praia_7_8_ November_2013/Concept_Note_GBEP_SI_Pilot_Workshop.pdf (last visited 24 February 2016). 89 Interview by the author with Michela Morese at the GBEP, Rome, 18 September 2013.
other? As noted, the sustainable bioenergy domain lacks a core umbrella regime at the international level. At the GBEP, the production of a legally binding document was not considered, and there have been no efforts to do so at the international level, except for the efforts of drafting standards in the ISO.
One reason for the lack of a core umbrella regime at the international level is the uncertainty and complicated nature of bioenergy and its impacts. Elevated levels of uncertainty were an important cause of the climate change regime complex as well. 90 Similarly, the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy involves myriad issues that cause uncertainty about the production and use of bioenergy. These issues not only include GHG emission savings but also food security, land-use rights, sustainable development in rural areas and environmental protection. For instance, we are still unsure whether, and how, biofuels can reduce GHG emissions in light of the scientific knowledge concerning differing GHG emissions for different feedstocks as well as the emissions from ILUC. Similarly, it is not certain how the production of biofuels originating from food crops affects food prices. These uncertainties as well as the ongoing difficult negotiations in the climate change area have discouraged states from negotiating an international agreement in the sustainable bioenergy domain.
Thus, no central and strong international regime exists, and the work of the GBEP appears to be a thin and weak umbrella regime at the international level, especially because it does not regulate sustainable productions and trading but only functions as sustainability indicators that are used for self-measurement tools in the context of developing bioenergy policies. However, even indicators can be one important governance tool. Existing literature has recognized indicators as governance 'tools' and 'technologies'. Kevin Davis and his colleagues' 2012 edited book, Governance by Indicators, is one well-known study on indicators and global governance. 91 The GBEP's indicators can be evaluated from three dimensions as a governance tool.
First, the GBEP's work, in the production of indicators, has created and framed a phenomenon and problem that demonstrates that the use of bioenergy involves various concerns, even at the local level of use (for example, cooking and heating) without production and trading for business purposes. 92 The 24 indicators are comprehensive in light of environmental, social and economic aspects, suggesting 'implicit theories of what is causing a problem, and of what it would mean to solve the problem' 93 for local communities in developing countries. Second, the process of the production of the GBEP indicators merits attention. The literature relating to indicators has noted that indicators are 'increasingly subject to … demands for transparency, participation, 90 Keohane and Victor, supra note 18, at 12. 91 reason-giving, and review', 94 and this is what the GBEP's indicator-setting processes have followed. Such processes have contributed to new knowledge production (as the result of indicators) and network creation (among participating countries, including developing countries). The third dimension is concerned with the effects of the indicators. The literature has argued that '[s]uccessful indicators -those that become influential and institutionalized -often produce powerful and unanticipated effects'. 95 Even though it cannot be said that the GBEP indicators have strongly influenced government policies worldwide, the GBEP indicators, as noted, have provided several African countries with knowledge and guidance in their bioenergy policies. Such subtle and nuanced effects of the indicators should not be overlooked.
Despite the fact that the GBEP's certain contribution to sustainable bioenergy can be admitted, it is the EU that plays a central role in the regime complex. Before examining the role of the EU, it is important to explain the link between the GBEP's work and the EU's regulatory act. Indeed, sustainability criteria and standards defined by the two regimes differ in the coverage: the EU established minimum criteria, but the GBEP (and private schemes, as discussed later in this article) set out more detailed indicators. However, such inconsistencies are not intended as 'the result of a strategy of regime shifting' by relevant countries. 96 Even though the GBEP's task force was launched later than the EU's biofuel initiative, considering the interests of developing countries more broadly, the two regimes are not competing under conflicting interests. Rather, it can be said that the GBEP is playing a role that the EU does not serve (note that the European Commission is also one partner of the GBEP). In contrast to the GBEP, the EU focuses more on markets and trade by engaging with the private sector.
The EU's global regulatory power has attracted scholars' attention in various issue areas, 97 and regulating sustainable biofuels is one such example. One important mechanism of the EU's regulatory power is based on its market power. Biofuel producers and traders, attracted by the size of the EU market, have attempted to secure their market access to Europe by being compliant with the sustainability criteria. At this point, the verification of sustainability matters and the development and proliferation of private certification initiatives have become relevant. 98 The literature explains that 'a demand for private authority will arise if there are actors [such as states and international organizations] who will benefit from such rules'. 99 In the bioenergy domain, there has been a demand from the EU for private certification schemes. The EU's verification system for approving private certification schemes has stimulated interest among feedstock growers, biofuel firms and NGOs in establishing private schemes. The role of private actors has also been acknowledged in the case of climate change. 100 However, in the case of sustainable biofuels, the private sector has evolved specifically in relation to the EU. The crucial role of the relationship between the EU's policy and private actors in stimulating creation of the sustainable bioenergy regime complex will be further discussed in the next subsection.
B Public-Private Interactions: The EU and Private Certification Schemes
Recently, public-private interactions -in other words, 'dynamics of the relationship between civil regulations and state policies' -have attracted scholarly attention. 101 Public policy and private schemes interact in various ways, 102 one of which occurs when public policy supports and promotes the use of private sustainability standards. An early example of such an interaction appeared in the government procurement context as some European states have promoted the use of sustainable products certified by private schemes in their procurement decisions. 103 The use of private certification schemes under the RED is another example of public-private interaction. 104 Under the EU RED, the European Commission 'has outsourced verification responsibilities to certification schemes which qualify for the job by meeting, in part or whole, the Sustainability Criteria'. 105 Similar to the concept of outsourcing, the concept of 'delegated authority', whereby 'states [delegate] key regulatory tasks to private firms', helps explain the relationship between the European Commission and private biofuel certification schemes. 106 Outsourcing and delegating to private actors happens 'because of (private actors') expertise', including local information/access and implementation capabilities. 107 If there are asymmetries between states/international organizations and private actors on such expertise, delegation to private actors is more likely to occur, thereby reducing transaction costs of states/ international organizations.
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Some studies suggest two anticipated consequences of such delegation. First, the private certification schemes benefit, wherein their relationships with state policies or EU legislation raise their name value and may lead to wider acceptance. According to the studies on private schemes for forestry or fishing, '[private certification schemes] receive legitimacy and greater uptake from incorporation into public policies'.
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Similar benefits can likewise be expected in private schemes covering sustainable biofuels.
The second expected effect of delegated authority is the greater diffusion of the EU sustainability criteria. The more private schemes, which are recognized by the European Commission, issue certifications worldwide, the more the EU's sustainability criteria are understood and proliferated. Thus, it has been argued that the use of approved private certification schemes may be one key driver of the 'extraterritorial impact of EU sustainability regulation'. 110 However, doubts exist as to whether the diffusion of EU sustainability standards through private certifications, in practice, increases the chances of 'harmonization' of sustainability biofuel criteria around the world or of 'some consolidation of the voluntary standards market'. 111 In fact, the European Commission's approval system has brought increased competition (and not necessarily harmonization) between private biofuel schemes, a topic that will be discussed in the next subsection.
C How the Private Sector Is Evolving: Between 'Competition (Fragmentation)' and 'Coordination'
Existing studies of private standards have recognized the increased competition between standard-setting schemes. Regulatory competition among private standards may not necessarily lead to negative results, such as 'a race to the bottom'. In contrast, some studies have argued that regulatory competition leads to positive effects, such as 'inducing rule convergence' or 'promoting innovative solutions'. 112 However, in the case of sustainable biofuels, concerns on negative results from competition have been expressed in the two contexts.
First, it has been widely recognized that private schemes for sustainable bioenergy vary in terms of the contents of their criteria and standards. The sustainable bioenergy domain is not perceived like a situation where 'business dominates' private certification schemes, adopting 'business-friendly standards', 113 because several multi-stakeholder initiatives are operating and those initiatives cover additional sustainability criteria that were not explicitly included in the RED, such as requiring of participatory consultation processes among relevant actors or consideration of rural development. At the same time, however, some other schemes (for example, business/ industry-based initiatives) tend to set out minimum sustainability standards. If operators choose to be certified by the schemes that have more rigorous sustainability criteria, ratcheting effects may result in the biofuel sector overall. However, this is not certain as operators may instead choose schemes with 'weaker standards, laxer verification procedures, and lower costs'.
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Second and related to the point above, the private schemes differ in terms of certification procedures, costs and monitoring processes. Private schemes might use such differentiation as a strategy to proliferate more than competing schemes -they might establish procedures and costs to make it easy for applicants to get certified, attracting the most amount of applicants and issuing more certifications than peer schemes. As evidenced, schemes within the bioenergy domain have varied widely in the number of certifications issued, from 8,300 by the ISCC to 18 by the RSB. 115 As a consequence, it is claimed that 'EU regulators have failed to establish a level playing field among biofuel certification schemes. This has created opportunities for forum shopping [by private business actors] and has triggered adverse competition'. 116 Although such abundance of, and competition among, private certification schemes cannot be easily controlled or confined, it may be possible to improve coordination between the schemes. In the sustainable bioenergy domain, in particular, there are two approaches to minimize the negative effects of escalating competition in this landscape: a comparison study and a benchmark process. 117 Comparison studies evaluate existing private schemes. For instance, three studies comparing approved biofuel schemes were recently released. Searching for Sustainability was published by the World Wide Fund for Nature, Germany, 118 Betting on Best Quality was published by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature's National Committee of the Netherlands, 119 and Biofuel Sustainability Performance Guidelines was published by the Natural Resources Defense Council. 120 Each report categorized the quality of the schemes using its own assessment methodologies. The Searching for Sustainability report did not attempt to rank the schemes but concluded that 'environmental and social performance varies greatly among the approved standards'. 121 The Betting on Best Quality report evaluated the private schemes based on the information provided in eight comparative studies. It ranked the RSB at the top, followed by Bonsucro and the RSPO; the ISCC was given a middle position. 122 In addition, the Biofuel Sustainability Performance Guidelines report examined seven schemes on the basis of their own indicators and summarized their performance results in visible table sheets. The report concluded that 'each certification system had strengths and weaknesses but that the [RSB] was clearly the most protective'. 123 These comparison studies have clearly indicated the discrepancies between the schemes approved by the European Commission and could provide information to operators considering which set of standards to follow, encouraging operators to choose a scheme of good quality. Despite the fact that these comparison studies are useful in assessing and disseminating information on the multiple competing schemes, 124 the evaluative criteria being used vary between studies, just as sustainability criteria vary between schemes. In other words, there is always doubt whether comparison studies have used objective criteria and appropriate insight for their evaluation.
Alternatively, benchmarking is a more precise tool to differentiate between private schemes. Benchmarking is more than a comparative analysis; the schemes themselves compare their own standards to those of another scheme and examine if there are overlaps or discrepancies. If there are significant similarities between the two standards, the two schemes can be benchmarked -operators compliant with one scheme are regarded as being compliant with the other. In practice, benchmarking will also reduce costs for operators who seek to earn certifications under two different schemes.
If widely pursued, such benchmarking processes could mitigate the fragmentation of private schemes. One recent example is the benchmarking between the RSB and Bonsucro. 125 In contrast to Bonsucro, the RSB has had additional requirements in terms of rural and social development, food security and the use of genetically modified organisms, 126 but otherwise the two schemes are quite similar. The fact that both schemes have full membership of the ISEAL Alliance might have made the benchmarking process easier in this instance, which is the only significant case of benchmarking between schemes in the bioenergy sector thus far.
How to Improve the Operation of the Regime Complex: Six Evaluative Criteria
The previous section examined the regime complex in the sustainable bioenergy domain; however, the regime complex is not at a standstill. It could be improved in the future, but without a concerted effort to do so it may be weakened. This section assesses the current regime situation of sustainable bioenergy by utilizing Keohane and Victor's six evaluative criteria: coherence, determinacy, epistemic quality, accountability, fairness and sustainability.
A Coherence
Coherence among regimes in the current sustainable bioenergy domain is evaluated by examining whether standards and certifications under the multiple sustainable bioenergy regimes appear to be 'compatible and mutually reinforcing'. 127 According to the analysis in the previous section, while the GBEP and the EU are 'loosely connected', the EU and the private sector have a tighter connection, which has helped the private sector to evolve and proliferate in the sustainable bioenergy domain. At this moment, the regime complex does not seem to generate negative influences in the pursuit of sustainable bioenergy. Rather, it can be said that the regime complex provides opportunities of 'addressing problems in multiple ways', 128 based on a shared understanding of the sustainability concerns related to bioenergy. However, it cannot be said that the situation is very positive, being 'compatible and mutually reinforcing'. Probably this situation can be described 'somewhere between compatible and harmful'. 129 The question is whether the regime complex will become more compatible or, instead, more harmful in the future. The remaining criteria may indicate which direction the regime complex goes.
B Determinacy
Keohane and Victor draw their determinacy criterion from Thomas Frank, who defines determinacy as 'textual clarity' and 'readily ascertainable normative content'. 130 Frank addresses the textual determinacy in treaties and domestic laws (that is, binding rules), but the determinacy of non-binding rules can be assessed as well. The sustainability criteria and standards adopted by the three elemental regimes are determinate to a certain extent. The EU RED is most determinate since the binding rules are clear in their normative content. As noted previously, the EU's directive was drawn upon the several EU member states' practices. Thus, the normative content was readily shared by member states, which leads to compliance.
However, the determinacy does not depend on binding force. Even the GBEP's indicators and the criteria established by private schemes, which are not legally binding, encompass determinacy. They are usually equipped with detailed procedures and guidelines for users, which enhance the determinacy of main standards and criteria, thereby promoting compliance. As Frank states, 'the more determinate a standard, the more difficult it is to justify non-compliance'.
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That said, the level of determinacy is quite different when we examine individual standards in detail. For instance, the standard on GHG emission reductions is fairly determinate among sustainability standards. Based on the terminology of environmental law, the GHG emission reduction standards are understood as 'emission standards' that 'specify [GHG] amounts which may be released from specific installations'. 132 Another example is that the standards requiring the protection of soil address the use and application of fertilizers and pesticides. They can be described as 'quality standards' that 'rely on the twin tools of "limit" and "guide" … values, and are expressed as micro-grammes per cubic metre, in a given area, over a specified reference period'.
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The standards categorized as 'emission standards' or 'quality standards' seem to be determinate because they can be measured objectively. However, standards such as the protection of labour rights or the enhancement of local food security are less clearly defined. For instance, with regard to the protection of workers' freedom of association and/or trade unionization rights, auditors are required to check various aspects and collect evidence on site about whether employers prevent associations from being established, whether workers are free to join associations, whether minutes of meetings exist and so on. As for food security, monitoring and assessing local food prices is required for compliance. Compliance with these standards depends on measurements conducted by auditors and how they assess situations.
Thus, the level of determinacy of sustainability standards for bioenergy is specific to each standard. Frank himself argues that 'textual determinacy is always a matter of degree, and the degree to which a rule exhibits determinacy varies from rule to rule'. 134 Consequently, it is not possible to judge the determinacy dimension of sustainability criteria and standards in general. On the other hand, it can be argued that as far as standards and criteria are concerned, epistemic quality and scientific knowledge are more important. This is not to say that determinate standards are always scientifically sound or that standards lacking in determinacy are necessarily scientifically unsound. Rather, even the standards that appear to be determinate may not be considered legitimate and credible if they are not based on epistemic quality and scientific knowledge. The epistemic quality dimension is considered next.
C Epistemic Quality
Epistemic quality is generally defined as 'reliable information needed for grappling with normative disagreement and uncertainty ', 135 professionals. 136 Such information and knowledge does not necessarily come in the form of scientific knowledge but may be based on other disciplines. 137 However, with regard to sustainable bioenergy, scientific knowledge is an important part of epistemic quality. Epistemic quality and scientific knowledge are highly valued for environmental legislation and risk regulation at both national and international levels. 138 It can be said that the EU has contributed to generate epistemic quality and scientific knowledge in the sustainable bioenergy domain. The discussions within the EU provided information on concerns over sustainable biofuels, and the EU's regulatory acts provided certain knowledge and direction in regulating biofuels, not only within the EU but also worldwide. However, as noted above, the EU also faced difficulties in regulating ILUC issues due to limitations in existing scientific knowledge. Thus, the EU has made continuous efforts to improve the epistemic quality of sustainable biofuels.
Similarly, the GBEP has provided broader knowledge on the use of bioenergy without trading, particularly for developing countries. Epistemic quality and scientific knowledge have been considered important in private standard setting as well. It has been argued that 'the supply of private authority is derived, at its core, from expert knowledge', 139 and expertise based on epistemic quality and scientific knowledge is important information that can be provided by private certification schemes. For instance, in their standard-setting processes, private certification schemes usually establish technical committees and working groups that engage in the development or revision of their principles and standards. These groups, normally comprised of members of the schemes, are considered to be professionals and experts who generate epistemic quality and scientific knowledge. In other cases, private schemes establish expert working groups on specific topics, such as developing a methodology to calculate GHG emissions 140 or a tool for protecting biodiversity.
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Overall, it can be said that each elemental regime has contributed to the epistemic quality of the sustainable biofuel domain. However, the question is whether there is 'the consistency between their rules and scientific knowledge' 142 among the regimes. As noted, sustainability criteria and standards defined by the three regimes differ in their coverage. The EU provides minimum criteria, but the GBEP and private schemes 136 The related concept of 'epistemic community' is defined as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area'. set out more detailed indicators, addressing environmental, social, economic and governance aspects. However, this article has argued that these coverage differences are not in conflict, as the purpose and function of each regime differ. At the same time, however, there are criticisms and concerns, as noted previously, that the RED provides deficient sustainability criteria and that private certification schemes vary in standard contents and compete with each other. This situation may lead to a negative recognition of inconsistencies and the insufficiency in epistemic quality of the regimes, thereby reducing the legitimacy of the regimes. Thus, it is essential that the regimes and relevant actors should realize the fragility of the epistemic quality and make efforts to improve legitimacy, which relates to the fourth and fifth dimensionsaccountability and fairness.
D Accountability
It is difficult to assess and ensure the accountability of the entire regime complex for sustainable bioenergy. In this regard, this subsection focuses on how accountability is manifested in the regime complex's elemental regimes. First, Keohane and Victor draw on the accountability concept put forth by Grant and Keohane that 'some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met'. 143 In other words, the actors being held accountable 'have to answer for [their] action or inaction' concerning 'accepted standards of behavior and … they will be sanctioned for failures to do so'. 144 This application of accountability can be better understood by applying the concept of 'internal accountability' 145 where principals and agents are 'institutionally linked to one another'. 146 It can be understood that the statement 'the actors being held accountable' refers to 'agents' who are subject to 'principals' who can require that the agents follow certain obligations.
One important aspect of internal accountability can be found in the relation between the EU and its member states. The EU holds its member states to internal accountability, as the EU establishes sustainability criteria for biofuels and monitors compliance. Ensuring accountability becomes particularly important when the EU outsources and delegates the monitoring task to private certification schemes. As part of this delegating activity, the European Commission screens approval requests from private schemes according to the assessment procedure that it has established, 147 with its approval decisions being reviewed every five years and reporting obligations to the European Parliament and to the Council on the operation of private schemes in the RED. 148 Furthermore, the EU's accountability is affected not only by its approval process for private certification schemes but also by how these approved schemes regularly certify and verify economic operators (farms and mills). In other words, the accountability mechanism is multi-layered. 149 While private schemes are required to have an independent auditing system (that is, a system where a third party certification body, independent from the private schemes, certifies applicants), 150 the credibility depends on each private scheme, establishing detailed procedures for certification bodies and auditors to strengthen their auditing systems. To strengthen accountability and credibility, these procedures should establish requirements for the impartiality and independence of the certification bodies, regulate the skills and qualifications of the auditors and provide auditors with detailed tasks.
Second, while the EU is accountable internally to its member states for how it approves private schemes, the private schemes themselves are also held accountable. As the activities of private schemes grow and expand, concerns have arisen about their 'external accountability', 151 a concept described by Keohane as 'accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it'. 152 In contrast with internal accountability, external accountability does not presuppose an accountability relationship between principals and agents.
The demand for external accountability first arose in debates regarding the role of powerful and expansive entities, 153 such as the United Nations (UN) and the WTO systems, 154 and was not placed on private regimes. Nevertheless, private regimes have increasingly been subjected to external accountability if 'private rules in the form of standards have far reaching consequences affecting a wide range of actors'. 155 In the sustainable bioenergy domain, various external stakeholders, in addition to the members of private schemes (for example, certified farms/mills under these schemes), are also affected by private standards and certifications, such as the general public or farms and mills located in developing countries.
One way to ensure that private schemes are held accountable to external stakeholders is to ensure 'input legitimacy'. As stated previously, such legitimacy would guarantee the inclusion of external stakeholders in decision-making processes. If a private regime's model is that of a multi-stakeholder initiative, input legitimacy might be stronger by design. However, even in multi-stakeholder initiatives, stakeholder engagement may be difficult or there may be unequal representation of stakeholder groups. Concerns over the external accountability and input legitimacy of private schemes may be at least partially addressed if the regimes improve on the fairness dimension, which is considered next.
E Fairness
Keohane and Victor do not explain the concept of fairness in detail, stating merely that '[regime complexes] should provide benefits widely'. 156 In the context of the proliferation of sustainability standards for bioenergy, fairness is focused on whether farms and mills in developing countries can make better use of sustainability standards for their exports, thereby gaining access to the sustainability market. Moreover, even if not involved in trading, communities and individuals in developing countries are still affected by sustainability standards when shifting from the unsustainable use of traditional bioenergy to the more modern and sustainable uses of bioenergy. The consideration of fairness in this context is substantive, focusing on 'distributive justice' among countries -for instance, whether regime complexes 'create solutions and systems which take into account society's answers to [the] moral issues of distributive justice'. 157 In addition to substantive considerations, a procedural aspect of fairness is also discussed in the literature, concerning 'what the participants perceive as right process'. 158 However, this procedural fairness is difficult to apply in the context of regime complexes, because the question is whether a regime complex is made under the right process. Regime complexes emerge without the right process or order, and that is why a comprehensive regime was not yielded. A possible inquiry is whether each elemental regime is fair in the procedural aspect -for instance, whether private certification schemes ensure 'input legitimacy' or 'procedural legitimacy' as addressed previously. Therefore, this subsection focuses on the substantive fairness aspect rather than the procedural one and examines whether the regime complex creates solutions for distributive justice.
One distributive fairness issue in the sustainable bioenergy domain is concerned with trade impacts of setting standards on developing countries. One topic of debate concerns whether private standards are functioning as trade barriers to exports from developing countries. 159 The WTO has been a well-known forum discussing the exclusionary and negative trade effects of private food safety standards on agricultural products from developing countries. 160 In the context of sustainable bioenergy standards, serious concerns exist whether producers in developing countries can earn certifications from the private schemes approved by the European Commission and thereby access the EU market. As noted, sustainable biofuels standards include many environmental and social standards that may present a challenge for farmers in developing countries. In this regard, the support programmes for smallholders that some private schemes have initiated might be helpful. For instance, the RSPO used some of its revenue to establish a 'Smallholders Support Fund'. 161 The RSB has undertaken pilot projects to 'improve the livelihoods of small farmers by linking them to markets and promoting sustainable practices'. 162 Bonsucro has also developed farmer support programmes, which target smallholders. 163 These programmes are attempts to increase opportunities for small farmers to participate effectively in the market, and simultaneously, it also provides chances for private certification schemes to explore new applicants for their certifications. It would be desirable if both private schemes and small farmers can benefit through working together. However, there are farmers in developing countries who are still excluded from the community of standards and certifications due to the lack of information and capacities to start up sustainable production. In this vein, the GBEP plays a key role in supporting the planning and implementation of sustainable bioenergy policy in developing countries. As noted above, its focus is on developing countries rather than on firms and traders who are already operating in the global bioenergy market and are able to gain sustainability certifications. The GBEP's initiatives contribute to the fairness dimension of the regime complex by responding to the exclusionary effects of sustainability regulations and to the basic needs of developing countries.
There is another recent initiative at the international level to make private standards act as trade opportunities instead of trade barriers. The UN Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) was launched in March 2013 under the partnership of five UN agencies: the FAO, the International Trade Centre, the UN Industrial Development Organization, the UN Environmental Program and the UN Conference on Trade and Development. The objective of the UNFSS is to make sustainability standards useful for developing countries by viewing them as 'a strategic policy issue, linked to the internalization of environmental and social costs, as well as the promotion of developing countries' competitiveness in and access to growing 'sustainability' markets'. 164 Similarly, it has been recognized that '[t]he rational for creating UNFSS is to shift the focus from seeing [voluntary sustainability standards] as ends in themselves or mere technical tools, to recognizing them as a means to sustainable development and to contextualize them into the macro-economic development perspective'. 165 The impact of sustainability standards in general is still under evaluation, 166 but it might be useful to explore a positive approach towards sustainability standards and how they can create opportunities for developing countries.
F Sustainability
Finally, the sustainability criterion evaluates whether a regime complex is sufficiently viable to maintain a long-term existence. The future duration of the current bioenergy regime complex is influenced by two factors. The first factor is uncertainty over future demand and supply in the world bioenergy market. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), bioenergy currently contributes 10 per cent of the world's total primary energy supply. 167 Although the IEA's roadmap estimates a threefold increase in bioenergy supply by 2050, 168 this supply will be influenced by issues such as feedstock production, technology development and trade volume.
The second factor affecting the duration of the regime complex is whether the EU can maintain a stable and sound bioenergy policy along with the RED, thereby maintaining its market power and attracting more exporters of sustainable biofuels. Some uncertainties over the EU's future market size for sustainable biofuels may influence existing private certification businesses and generate negative incentives for bioenergy operators and traders, causing them to pursue only short-term business advantages.
Conclusion
This article has addressed the regime complex for sustainable bioenergy, which comprises three elemental regimes at the international, regional and private levels. The regime complex situation addressed in this article has emerged mainly for two reasons: a high degree of uncertainty in this domain and the presence of public-private interactions. Although the high degree of uncertainty has prevented the emergence of a core umbrella regime at the international level, the regulatory collaboration between the EU and private schemes has mobilized and promoted sustainability certification businesses, resulting in international reach and impact. Overall, the sustainable bioenergy regime complex is functioning well, as each regime is playing an important role in the proliferation of sustainability standards for bioenergy. The article then has attempted to evaluate whether the current situation of the bioenergy regime complex can be further improved. To do so, this article has applied Keohane and Victor's six evaluative criteria.
Many areas for improvement exist in the current regime complex for sustainable bioenergy. Although each regime is not extremely diversified in terms of coherence, determinacy and epistemic quality aspects, there are still notable incompatibilities and 166 For the importance of reviewing the impacts, see the State of Sustainability Initiatives, State of Sustainability Initiative Review (2014) and the Committee on Sustainability Assessment, Measuring Sustainability Report (2014). 167 IEA, supra note 1, at 10. 168 Ibid., at 35.
